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Chapter 3 provides specific description of how the project was implemented in New Labour’s first term, which ended in 2001. New Labour mandated the formation of Crime Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRP) to tie local authorities to police service and take responsibility for creating and implementing crime and disorder reduction. CDRPs included the district council, probation committee, authorities from police, fire, and health agencies, and representatives from other agencies that are related to crimes. Chapter 4 explains a struggle to shift crime prevention from the margins to the mainstream starting at the beginning of the New Labour’s second term in 2001 and extending through 2006. New Labour tried to reform police and local government and suggested the new localism for safer and stronger communities. Chapter 5 evaluated the Anti Social Behavior (ASB) policy and the reasons why the policy has emerged as a new domain for government attention. ASB policy is to strongly regulate any individuals who cause harassment, alarm, or distress to others. It is based on a “tough on crime, tough on causes of crime” approach, and it is consistent with what is called “broken window theory,” which suggests that reducing signs of disorder will reduce crime. Chapter 6 considers the problem of social exclusion and the need for policies to address unemployment, gaps in child care, and the need to build community participation. The social inequalities and the frustration of relatively deprived people cause social exclusion. For example, when young men are unemployed, they are socially excluded, become more violent, and engage in intimidating masculinity. The government provides unemployed persons paid-work, which is called Labour’s New Deal, to prevent them from committing crimes. Children in socially excluded families are educated with special programs to isolate them from crimes. Community members are encouraged to participate in the policy process to resolve the conflicts due to multiple cross-cutting identities in the community. In the final chapter, Gilling concludes that the project may constrain freedom and govern the population and agencies under the name of crime control, even though the dominant value of the project is to expand freedom through securing safety. Gilling criticizes the project’s intended help for an imaginary middle-class England and its neglect of social inequality.

By analyzing the project as a product of politics, Gilling has provided a critical perspective on crime control. He stressed the importance of discourse in the development of policy and of unintended effects of policy. In particular, he questions risk management through the physical exclusion of the disadvantaged such as alcoholics on the street and homeless individuals. He highlighted that the project seems to be a more progressive view of community safety, but local crime control policy is quite conservative because the project neglects social inequity and excludes the underclass.

Gilling has provided a clear and comprehensive summary of a very complicated project to address crime. He contrasted the crime control approach with alternatives, such as U.S. programs such as workfare under the Clinton administration or the Perry Pre-school Program that eventually reduced delinquency. The book provides unique insight into and criticism of the effect of politics on crime policies. It would be useful for policy makers, criminologists, and students interested in crime prevention and control policies.

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Ratcliffe’s text is a seminal work on a new policing paradigm, *intelligence-led policing*. This work codifies existing research and examples of the concept along with a clear-cut definition:
Intelligence-led policing is a business model and managerial philosophy where data analysis and crime intelligence are pivotal to an objective, decision-making framework that facilitates crime and problem reduction, disruption and prevention through both strategic management and effective enforcement strategies that target prolific and serious offenders. (Page 6).

Ratliffe carefully integrates what is known about intelligence-led policing in an understandable and readable fashion. This definition serves as an outline for his presentation of this paradigm.

Ratliffe's historical analysis places intelligence-led policing in the "eras of policing" following community policing, problem-oriented policing, and Compstat. Indeed, its use of crime data to strategically target resources is a direct outgrowth and extension of the police paradigms that preceded it. Ratliffe makes a strong case for its adoption and use in police departments of all sizes. Recall that O. W. Wilson was a strong advocate of the benefits of crime analysis, but he relegated it to large departments that had planning units. The driving force behind intelligence-led policing is the "3-i model (interpret, influence, impact)," which uses crime data to interpret the environment and ultimately take action against criminal behavior. This process is also an outgrowth of evaluation research that attempts to assess the effectiveness of police programs and policies.

The ability of intelligence generated by valid research, such as evaluation products, has long been resisted by police departments. Ratliffe points out the difficulties that crime analysts face, not only in their research but also in the utility of their final product. Acceptance of the intelligence-led approach will require police managers to become strategic thinkers, willing to anticipate problems and promote solutions. They will also need to become more data driven in their decision making. Crime data can be so much more than just an indicator of disorder. The information that the police regularly generate about crime must be put to regular and routine use rather than compiling statistics for the Uniform Crime Report.

The intelligence-led policing paradigm confirms that the police can use crime data and information to combat crime. This is a notion that criminologists typically loathe to acknowledge. Intelligence can help the police deal with crimes that they can influence—especially street-level violence and order maintenance crimes. The targeting of serious offenders that Ratliffe advocates has been done in several cities (e.g., Highpoint, North Carolina; Cincinnati, Ohio) under violence reduction programs operating under the model pioneered by Professor David Kennedy in the Boston Gun Project. Use of data can lead to more effective policing.

The one possible limitation is the same problem that has faced all recent paradigm shifts in policing, including team policing, community policing, problem-oriented policing, and Compstat. For such reforms to be effective, they must be practiced by the organization as a whole. They cannot be relegated to command staff meetings or ghettoized in a special projects unit. The line staff must be intimately involved in the planning and implementation of intelligence-led policing. They must see the value in the data that crime analysts produce. Their expertise as the work force that toils every day at the client level must be tapped in to and used. For intelligence-led policing to reach its full potential, police departments must function as learning organizations. As defined by Senge, learning organizations collect and use knowledge to respond to an ever-changing environment. This knowledge is translated in a useful way to the members of the organization who can use it to do their daily work in a more effective manner. Intelligence-led policing exactly fits this definition. In this fashion, intelligence-led policing is a management tool rather than a crime reduction strategy or operation.

Ratliffe is keenly aware that the adoption of this paradigm will require a revolution and an evolution in police management. His "10 yardsticks" for intelligence-led policing include the previously mentioned need for a supportive and informed command structure that uses the paradigm as the heart of its organizational approach. The full integration of crime analysis into decision making with a focus on prolific offenders is also required. Thus, major shifts in traditional thinking must be underway.
This book should be read by all serious police scholars as well as police leaders. To meet the requirements of intelligence-led policing, research should be applied in nature and focus. Valid and reliable data are the fuel for intelligence-led policing. Indeed, it cannot function without it. This type of analysis cannot come from canned data sets and compilation of official statistics. It will require the development of new and accurate measures of police performance and not just the structuring of sophisticated statistical methods. Thus, intelligence-led policing presents a very worthwhile challenge to all persons involved in the true mission of policing. As noted by Ratcliffe, this mission is to keep the public safe and secure.

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